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NOTES & COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF MECHANICS' LIENS
STATUTES
The nation's first mechanics' lien' statute was enacted by the
Maryland General Assembly in 1791 to stimulate construction of the
new capital city of Washington.' Since that time all fifty states have
enacted mechanics' lien laws.' These liens are designed to secure
compensation to creditors who perform labor or furnish materials for
the improvement of real property.4 Although specific provisions of
A mechanics' lien is a lien on real property "created by statute, to secure the
compensation of persons who, under contract with the owner, or some person author-
ized in his behalf, contribute labor or materials to the improvement of the property."
H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1575 (1939) [hereinafter cited as TIFFANY].
2 Laws of Maryland, 1791, ch. 45, § 10. The statute granted to "master builders"
a lien as security for payment for their work. The lien extended only to those builders
having a direct contract with the property owner and was geographically limited to the
situs of the new capital city.
The general growth of city construction throughout the nineteenth century fos-
tered the passage of mechanics' liens statutes in many states, 3 R. POwELL, THE LAW
OF REAL PROPERTY 483, at 728 (1949) [hereinafter cited as POWELL], and gradually
extended the class of persons entitled to their benefit beyond those having an immedi-
ate contractual relationship with the property owner. The variety among the statutes
of the several states led to the proposal of a uniform act in 1932. The Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, stating that the "varied conditions made uniformity impossi-
ble," withdrew the proposed statute in 1943. POWELL, supra, at 229-30. Hence, the
variances among the state statutes continue today. In 1975, the Commissioners ap-
proved and recommended for adoption the Uniform Land Transactions Act. Article 5
of that act dealt with construction (mechanics' and materialmen's) liens and was
designed to unify the various state mechanics' lien statutes. However, the Commis-
sioners did not approve Article 5 and gave no explanation for the deletion, thereby
excluding that article from their recommendation for nationwide adoption of the uni-
form law. In the Commissioner's annual meeting in August, 1976, they included in
their recommendation for the adoption of a Uniform Simplification of Land Transfers
Act, a proposal for construction liens. The American Bar Association's section of Real
Property, Probate & Trust Law has not yet reviewed that proposal.
3 For a compilation of some of the more significant aspects of the various states'
mechanics' liens statutes, see [1977] SECURED TRANS. GUIDE (CCH) 8301-8580.
TIFFANY, supra note 1, at § 1575. Mechanics' liens are purely statutory in origin
with no basis in common law or equity. II GLENN, MORTGAGES § 351 (1943) [hereinafter
cited as GLENN]. See Note, The Proposed Uniform Mechanics' Lien Act, 19 VA. L. REv.
406 (1933). As such, few general rules regarding judicial construction of mechanics' lien
statutes exist. The generally accepted approach, however, is to construe strictly
whether a person is within the group sought to be protected by the statute, while
viewing the remedial and procedural provisions of the statutes more liberally. See, e.g.,
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such statutes vary widely among the several states,5 mechanics' liens
generally secure payment to contractors, sub-contractors, material-
men and laborers by granting them a specific interest in the real
property improved by their efforts, enforceable through foreclosure.0
Sikkema v. Packard, 79 N.J. Super. 599, 192 A.2d 334 (1963); Martin v. Baird Hard-
ware Co., 147 So. 2d 142 (Fla. App. 1962); see POWELL, supra note 2, at 484; TIFFANY,
supra note 1, at §§ 1575-76. Compare Lembke Constr. Co. v. J.D. Coggins Co., 72 N.M.
259, 382 P.2d 983 (1963)(right to lien is purely statutory and claimant must in first
instance bring himself clearly within terms of statute under strict construction) with
Fisher v. Reamer, 146 W. Va. 83, 118 S.E.2d 76 (1961) (court should apply liberal
construction where there is clear right to the lien and controversy is whether claimant
proceeded properly to establish lien). The more relaxed analysis of procedural provi-
sions has been written into several statutes which require only substantial compliance
with procedural provisions. See, e.g., VA. CODE § 43-5 (1976). However, given the recent
due process constitutional attack on prejudgment creditors' remedies, this liberal con-
struction may no longer be valid. See text accompanying notes 90-125 infra.
See notes 13-19 infra.
Persons entitled to a lien and questions as to whether the lien attaches only to
the property on which the improved structure stands or includes adjacent properties
are determined only by reference to the particular statute. Compare Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 289.01(3)(West Cum. Supp. 1976-77)(lien extends to all contiguous land, but if
improvement located wholly on one platted lot, lien limited to that lot) with ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 82, § 1 (Smith-Hurd Cum. Supp. 1977)(lien is on whole of tract or lot and
extends to adjoining lots or tracts).
In granting liens to subcontractors and others with no direct contract with the
property owner, two different theories have developed. Under the "New York" system,
the subcontractor is given a lien by way of subrogation or derivation from the general
contractor's rights against the property owner. See, e.g., N.Y. [LIEN] LAW (Consol.)
§ 4 (1966). The New York system subcontractor's claim is limited to the amount due
the general contractor at such time as the subcontractor gives notice of his claim to
the owner. The owner may thus withhold payment to the general contractor in sums
sufficient to satisfy the subcontractor's lien. Moreover, the total of all mechanics' liens
which can be recovered is thereby limited to the unpaid balance at the time of filing.
Under the other theory, frequently termed the "Pennsylvania" system, the sub-
contractor is given a direct lien without regard to the rights of the general contractor.
See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 289.01(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1976-77). The lien claimant
under the Pennsylvania system, however, is not restricted to satisfaction of his claim
by payments not yet made by the owner to the general contractor. Under the latter
system, the total amount of liens claimed possibly will exceed both the contract price
and the market value of the property. See Indianapolis Power &'Light Co. v. South-
eastern Supply Co., 146 Ind. App. 554, 257 N.E.2d 722 (1970). Compare N.Y. [LIEN]
LAW (Consol.) § 4 (1966)(owner liability for individual lien shall not be greater than
sum unpaid on contract at time notice of subcontractor lien is filed; total liability for
all liens limited to value of price remaining unpaid at time of notice of lien) and VA.
CODE § 43-7 (1976)(subcontractor's lien shall not exceed amount owner is indebted to
general contractor) with IND. CODE ANN. § 32-8-3-2 (Burns 1971)(subcontractor has lien
on property to extent of value of labor and materials furnished). See also GLENN, supra
note 4, at § 351; POWELL, supra note 2, at 484; TIFFANY, supra note 1, at § 1576; Note,
Mechanics Liens in Virginia, 29 VA. L. REv. 121 (1942); text accompanying note 14
infra.
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However, mechanics' liens statutes have recently come under attack,"
and 185 years after the first such statute was enacted, the Maryland
Supreme Court declared that state's law unconstitutional.,
In Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Brothers Roofing Co.,I the Su-
preme Court of Maryland held that the Maryland mechanics' lien
statute permits a property owner to be deprived of a significant prop-
erty interest without due process of law in violation of both the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 23
of the Maryland Declaration of Rights..' That holding was spawned
by a line of United States Supreme Court decisions regarding the
requirements of procedural due process in prejudgment creditors'
remedies." The Maryland decision and the constitutional analysis of
debtor-creditor relationships by the United States Supreme Court
suggest that a review of state mechanics' lien laws be undertaken.
Illustrative of the various state statutes, the statutory schemes of the
states within the Fourth Circuit will serve as the focal point for analy-
sis.'
Under Maryland's law,1' the mechanics' lien statute grants a lien
on structures and the immediate adjacent land to those who supply
labor or materials for the creation, erection, improvement or repair
of such property." The lien arises as soon as work commences or
See cases cited in notes 41 & 118 infra. The impetus of the recent constitutional
challenges to mechanics' liens statutes is a line of Supreme Court decisions involving
other prejudgment creditors' remedies. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Financing Corp., 395 U.S. 337
(1969). See generally Newton, Procedural Due Process and Prejudgment Creditor Rem-
edies: A Proposal for Reform of the Balancing Test, 34 WASH'. & LEE L. REv. 65 (1977);
Steinheimer, Address-Summary Prejudgment Creditors' Remedies and Due Process
of Law: Continuing Uncertainty After Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Company, 32 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 79 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Steinheimer].
Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976).
'Id.
Id. at 33, 353 A.2d at 233. See notes 26 & 91 infra. Following the decision in
Barry Properties, the Maryland legislature acted quickly to revise its mechanics' lien
statute to comply with the court's reasoning. See note 125 supra. For purposes of this
comment, all references, unless otherwise noted, to the Maryland statute will be to the
legislation in force at the time of the Barry Properties decision.
" See cases cited in note 7 supra and text accompanying notes 71-78, 90-118 infra.
2 See [1977] SECURED TRANS. GUIDE (CCH) 8301-8580.
' MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE ANN. §§ 9-101 to 111 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1975)(re-
pealed and replaced by 1976 Md. Laws ch. 349 (Advance Sheets, 938)) (codified at
MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE ANN. §§ 9-101 to 113 (Cum. Supp. 1976)). See note 10 supra.
The Maryland statute in effect at the time of the Barry Properties decision is not
atypical of many such statutes. See [1977] SECURED TRANS. GUIDE (CCH) 8301-
8580.
" MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE ANN. § 9-102 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1975)(work on
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materials are supplied15 and lasts until 180 days after work is com-
pleted or materials furnished even though no claim is filed. 6 If the
work or materials are supplied by a subcontractor, materialman, or
laborer without a contract with the owner, the lien claimant must
give written notice to the owner of intent to claim a lien within 90
days of completing work. 7 To perfect his lien, a claimant, regardless
of whether he has a contract with the owner, must file a claim with
the clerk of the circuit court of the county in which the property is
located within the 180 day period. 8 Upon filing with the county clerk,
the lien subsists for one year, and expires if foreclosure proceedings
are not brought. 9 During the one-year period, however, the property
owner or any interested party may bring proceedings in equity to
compel the claimant to prove the validity of the lien or have the lien
declared void."0 In addition, the property owner may release his prop-
buildings, wharves, machines, swimming pools covered by lien statute; landscaping
and drilling of wells included; lien extends to land covered by the building and so much
of adjacent land as may be necessary for ordinary and useful purposes of the building).
Other statutes vary as to the work encompassed and as to the extent of the lien. See,
e.g., S.C. CODE § 45-251 (Cum. Supp. 1975)(work on buildings, wells, grading and
filling land, paving curbs and sidewalks, constructing ditches and drainage facilities,
and laying pipes for water, gas and electric purposes included); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 1311.021 (Page Supp. 1976)(work on houses, mills, manufactories, furnaces, bridges,
gas pipelines included); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 429.010 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1977)(lien on
land to extent of three acres if outside city or town); statutes cited in note 6 supra.
15 MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE ANN. § 9-105 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1975). In Maryland
and in many other states the liens are said to "relate back" to the time when the work
first began. In addition, many states provide that all lien creditors of the same class
participate without priority. See, e.g., N.Y. [LIEN] LAW (Consol.) § 13 (1966)(subcon-
tractors and materialmen shall have no priority on .account of the time of filing their
respective notices of liens, but all liens shall be on parity); MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE
ANN. § 9-107 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1975)(lien claimants shall be paid in proportion to
their respective amounts). The effect of such provisions is that lien claimants, who
perfect their liens within applicable time limits after completing work, will have liens
relating back to the first work performed by any similar lien claimant.
is MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE ANN. § 9-105(e) (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1975). See W. VA.
CODE §§ 38-2-8 to 13 (1966) (90 days); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-12(b) (1976) (120 days).
" MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE ANN. § 9-103(a)(1974 & Cum. Supp. 1975). See W. VA.
CODE § 38-2-9, 11, 13 (1966)(notice to owner within 60 days). But see S.C. CODE § 45-
259 (1962)(no requirement of notice to owner).
11 See text accompanying note 16 supra. The clerk will then record the lien in a
Mechanics' Lien Docket. MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE ANN. § 9-105 (1974 & Cum. Supp.
1975). See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-A12(a)(1976)(claims of liens must be filed in office of
clerk in each county wherein real property improved by claimant's efforts is located).
19 MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE ANN. § 9-106 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1975); OHIO REV.
CODE § 1311.13 (Page 1962)(six years); VA. CODE § 43-17 (1976)(six months).
MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE ANN. § 9-106 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1975); see Continen-
tal Steel Corp. v. Sugarman, 266 Md. 541, 295 A.2d 493 (1972).
MECHANICS' LIENS
erty from the lien by substituting a bond.2' If in either a foreclosure
suit or proceeding brought by the owner, the claimant establishes a
valid claim, the court will order payment of the claim within a speci-
fied time or order sale of the property to satisfy the lien.
2
1
The constitutional challenge to the Maryland statute arose in a
foreclosure suit brought by a subcontractor, Fick Brothers Roofing
Company, to enforce a mechanics' lien against Barry Properties, Inc.,
the property owner.? Conceding that the subcontractor had complied
with all applicable statutes and procedures, 24 Barry Properties moved
for summary judgment on the ground that the lien statute unconsti-
tutionally deprived it of property without due process of law., The
21 MD. R.P. BG75 (amended by BG76, Cum. Supp. 1976)(owner of property
against which mechanics' lien has been recorded may petition court to have property
released from lien together with bond sufficient in amount to pay sum claimed, with
interest and costs). An owner might want to release his property from a lien by substi-
tuting a bond for several reasons. Often, lien claims arise following a dispute and the
discharge of a contractor by the owner. At that point, an owner unexpectedly would
need additional funds to hire a new contractor at an increased cost to finish the project.
See Ominsky, The Mechanics' Lien Filed Despite a No-Lien Stipulation: Methods of
Prevention and Removal, 72 DIcK. L. Rav. 223, 238-39 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Ominsky]. An owner, however, would have difficulty in financing a secondary con-
struction loan on property encumbered by a lien. See text accompanying notes 65-68
infra. Further, an owner would not have a clear title and might not be able to close a
pending mortgage on property subject to outstanding claims on liens. See text accom-
panying note 67 infra. Moreover, the terms of many construction loans provide that if
a lien is filed, the lender has the right to stop making construction advances thereby
causing work stoppages pending release of the property or resolution of the lien claim.
See Ominsky, supra, at 238-39.
22 MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE ANN. § 9-106 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1975).
2 277 Md. at 21, 353 A.2d at 226-27. The property owner, Barry Properties, had
contracted with Associated Engineers, Inc., as general contractor, to construct a build-
ing on Barry Properties' land. Associated contracted wiih Fick Brothers, which, as a
subcontractor, was to construct the building's roof. Fick Brothers fully satisfied its
obligation and was owed $11,610 by Associated Engineers. Subsequently, Fick Broth-
ers filed a mechanics' lien on the property and brought suit to foreclose. Id.
24 Id. Barry Properties conceded that Fick Brothers' notice to claim a lien, filing
of the lien, and bill of complaint to enforce the lien were procedurally adequate. See
text accompanying notes 17-22 supra.
2 277 Md. at 21, 353 A.2d at 226-27. For purposes of the motion for summary
judgment, the parties stipulated that the mechanics' lien prevented the property owner
from being paid the balance of its construction loan since the lender withheld payment
pending the outcome of all mechanics' liens claims. The parties further stipulated that
the lien prevented Barry Properties from closing a permanent mortgage or from obtain-
ing a second mortgage on its equity in the property. Barry Properties asserted that the
operation of the lien statute thus deprived it of a significant property interest. Id. at
21, 353 A.2d at 227-28.
Barry Properties further contended that the statute contravened the require-
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lower court concluded that the lien was valid and that there was no
denial of due process,26 and Barry Properties appealed to the Mary-
land Supreme Court.Y
To establish a due process cause of action28 a plaintiff must prove
that he was deprived of a significant property interest29 through some
state action." In Barry Properties, the Maryland court appropriately
ments of procedural due process mandated by the fourteenth amendment of the United
States Constitution and Article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Article 23
provides: "That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold,
liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived
of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the
land." MD. CONST., DECLAR. OF RTs. art. 23. The Maryland court noted that article 23
and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment have the same meaning and
effect with regard to alleged deprivations of property. 277 Md. at 22, 353 A.2d at 227.
See Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal & Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 156, 321 A.2d
748, 755 (1974); Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 219
Md. 607, 150 A.2d 421, 426-27 (1959); Baltimore Belt R.R. v. Baltzell, 75 Md. 94, 23
A. 74, 74 (1891) ("law of land" is equivalent to "due process of law" as used in federal
constitution); note 85 infra.
2, 277 Md. at 21, 353 A.2d at 227. The trial court also appointed a trustee to sell
the property to satisfy the lien unless it was paid within 30 days. Id.
Id. The Maryland Supreme Court granted certiorari while the case was pending
in the Court of Special Appeals.
2 The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment provides: "[N]or shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
29 See text accompanying notes 36-38 infra.
30 The state action doctrine first found expression in The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3 (1883). The Supreme Court, in striking down an act of Congress prohibiting
discrimination by private individuals providing public accommodations, stated:
until some State law has been passed, or some State action through
its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens
sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation
of the United States . . . nor any proceeding under such legislation,
can be called into activity: for the prohibitions of the amendment are
against State laws and acts done under State authority.
109 U.S. at 13.
Since 1883, the courts have upheld a distinction between deprivations by the
states subject to due process restrictions and private conduct immune from fourteenth
amendment scrutiny. The state action test has been espoused in many forms. Courts
have found state action where private citizens perform a "public function," e.g., Marsh
v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 505-06 (1946), where private individuals are "clothed" with
state authority, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,473 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring), and where state action might "encourage" private activity violative of due pro-
cess, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967). See Catz & Robinson, Due
Process and Creditor's Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to Mitchell, North
Georgia and Beyond, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 541, 572-79 (1975)[hereinafter cited as
Catz]. See generally Black, Foreword: "State Action, " Equal Protection, and Califor-
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looked first to determine whether state action was present.3 1 While
the distinction between private and state action often has proved
difficult in application,3 2 the issue in the field of mechanics' liens is
straightforward.3 Mechanics' liens are created, regulated, and en-
forced by the states,3' and consequently the Maryland court found
sufficient state action to satisfy the initial due process requirement.3
The court then considered the second preliminary question of
whether the state action operated to deprive plaintiff-property own-
ers of a significant property interest. Although the fourteenth amend-
ments shields persons from deprivations of life, liberty, and property
without due process, not all property interests are constitutionally
cognizable.3 1 Unless significant property interests are affected, the
nia's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69 (1967)[hereinafter cited as Black]; Note,
State Action: Theories for Applying Constitutional Restrictions to Private Activity, 74
COLUM. L. REv. 656 (1974). The Supreme Court most recently affirmed the state
action-private conduct dichotomy in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974), holding that there was no state action which would invoke fourteenth amend-
ment safeguards in the termination of electric service by a state regulated private
utility. Id. at 358-59.
31 277 Md. at 22-23, 353 A.2d at 227.
31 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974). Compare
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961) with Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). State action has been characterized as a "conceptual
disaster area." See Black, supra note 30, at 95.
" The readily apparent presence of state action in creating, regulating, and en-
forcing mechanics' liens statutes has led many courts reviewing the constitutionality
of such legislation to ignore this preliminary issue. See, e.g., Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F.
Supp. 432 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997
(D. Ariz. 1973), aff'd mem., 417 U.S. 901 (1974). The few courts which have examined
the state action requirement have had no difficulty in finding sufficient state involve-
ment. See Caesar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645, 647-48 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Connolly Dev.,
Inc. v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 803, 553 P.2d 637, 645, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1976).
Indeed, no court has held to the contrary.
The state action requirement has been much more important in challenges to
other prejudgment creditors' remedies. See, e.g., Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv.
Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975)(no state action in nonjudicial mortgage foreclo-
sure); Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974)(no state action in garageman's
lien); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1974)(no state action in
automobile repossession statute); Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976)(no
state action on self-help repossession under UCC). Contra Brooks v. Flagg Bros., Inc.,
45 L.W. 2499 (2d Cir. April 4, 1977). Many of these statutes involve merely a codifica-
tion of common law remedies and courts have declined to find state action on that
basis. See, e.g., Bond v. Dentzer, 494 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1974). See generally Burke &
Reber, State Action, Congressional Power and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the
Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1 (1973); Catz, supra note 30, at 572-84.
31 See text accompanying notes 4, 13-22 supra.
277 Md. at 22-23, 353 A.2d at 227.
" Compare Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)(nontenured college teacher
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full panoply of due process procedural safeguards are not required.31
The Barry Properties court reasoned that a lien which arises as soon
as work is performed or materials are supplied constitutes a cloud on
the owner's title.3 As such, the lien not only makes alienation or
further encumbrance of the property extremely difficult, but also
diminishes the owner's equity to the extent of the lien.39 Thus, the
court determined that the Maryland mechanics' lien statutory
scheme constituted a deprivation of a significant property interest
demanding the protection of due process of law."
In contrast with the Maryland court's decision in Barry
Properties, however, several other courts have held that the interests
of a property owner affected by a mechanics' lien are not significant
and hence not cognizable under the fourteenth amendment.', In
Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc.,42 a three-judge district court
upheld Arizona's mechanics' and materialmen's liens statute against
attack by property owners who alleged that the statutes violated due
process for failing to provide notice and a hearing prior to the filing
of the lien. 3 Holding that the difficulty in freely alienating the prop-
had actionable property interest in continued employment cognizable under four-
teenth amendment) with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)(nontenured
college teacher had no cognizable property interest in continued employment where
hired for one year with no promise of reemployment). See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S.
134, 151-53, 155 (1974); Id. at 164-67 (Powell, J., concurring); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 260-64 (1970); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy,
367 U.S. 886, 894-98 (1961); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 491-92, 507-08 (1959);
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157-58, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930
(1961); Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 531, 532-
39 (1975).
11 See cases cited in note 36 supra.
18 277 Md. at 23, 353 A.2d at 227-28. See text accompanying note 16 supra. The
court noted that the lien also becomes an encumbrance on record when timely filed.
277 Md. at 23 n.6, 353 A.2d at 228 n.6.
31 277 Md. at 24, 353 A.2d at 228. See text accompanying notes 58-68 infra.
10 277 Md. at 24, 353 A.2d at 228.
41 See, e.g., Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997 (D. Ariz.
1973), aff'd mem., 417 U.S. 901 (1974); Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24, 27 (D.S.D.
1973); cf. Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432, 436 (S.D. Fla. 1974)(dictum).
42 379 F. Supp. 997 (D. Ariz. 1973), affd mem., 417 U.S. 901 (1974). But see text
accompanying note 84 infra.
11 379 F. Supp. at 997-98. The Arizona mechanics' lien statute, ARIz. Rav. STAT.
§§ 33-981 to 1006 (1956), provided that to perfect a lien, a claimant must file within
90 days, a claim with the county reporter of the county in which the improved property
is located, if the claimant had a direct contract with the owner, or 60 days for all other
claimants. Id. at § 33-993. The claim of lien must include names of the owner and
person by whom the claimant was employed or to whom he furnished materials, a
description of the land and improvements, a statement of the terms and conditions of
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erty impressed with a lien was not a significant property interest, 4
the court distinguished a host of prior Supreme Court decisions." The
Spielman-Fond court reasoned that previous cases involving total
deprivations of property interests which demanded procedural
safeguards were inapposite, in that mechanics' and materialmen's
leins do not dispossess owners of their property." The court noted
that owners are not totally deprived of their property or its use until
a court reaches an adverse result in a foreclosure suit. 7 Since the
owner remains in possession, retains the use of the land," and assum-
ing he can find a willing purchaser, is not prohibited from alienating
his property, the court concluded that there was no deprivation of a
significant property interest.49 More specifically, Spielman-Fond held
that the filing of a mechanics' or materialmen's lien does not amount
to a taking of a significant property interest and a violation of due
the contract, a statement of the lienor's demand and the date of completion of the
building. Id. In addition, the claimant must serve the property owner with a copy of
the claim of lien within a "reasonable time" after filing with the county reporter. Id.
In Spielman-Fond, the defendants had furnished labor and materials in the develop-
ment of plaintiff's mobile home park. The defendants alleged they were not paid for
this work and filed a lien on the plaintiff's property. Claiming that the lien statute
deprived it of the property interest in free alienation without due process of law, the
owner-plaintiff sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) for redress of a deprivation of
constitutional rights, to have the lien statute declared unconstitutional, and to enjoin
the defendant from its enforcement. Id.
11 379 F. Supp. at 999. But see text accompanying notes 58-68 infra.
Is 379 F. Supp. at 998-99. The district court distinguished the following decisions
which invalidated a variety of statutes and procedures on due process grounds: Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972)(writ of replevin); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970)(termination of welfare benefits); and Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395
U.S. 337 (1969)(garnishment of wages). The court held that by contrast to those deci-
sions, the filing of a mechanics' lien involved no actual physical taking of property.
379 F. Supp. at 997-98. In addition, the Spielman-Fond court distinguished previous
decisions which had held that the right to alienate one's property freely was entitled
to constitutional protection by reasoning that those cases involved direct and total
deprivations of the right to alienate the property. 379 F. Supp. at 999. See Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
" But see note 59 infra..
17 379 F. Supp. at 997-99. See text accompanying note 59 infra.
"' The Spielman-Fond court was technically correct in noting that the prior deci-
sions did not involve total deprivation of the owners' property. But see note 59 infra.
1' 379 F. Supp. at 999-1000. Accord, In re Northwest Homes of Chehalis, Inc., 526
F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976); In re Thomas A. Cary, Inc.,
412 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 1976); In re The Oronoka, 393 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Me. 1975);
Bustell v. Bustell, 555 P.2d 722 (Sup. Ct. Mont. 1976). Cf. Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F.
Supp. 432 (S.D. Fla. 1974)(dictum; if compelled to determine whether attachment of
mechanics' lien constitutes deprivation of significant property interest of owner, court
would hold it does not).
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process under the fourteenth amendment for failing to provide for
notice and a hearing prior to the filing of the lien."
Similarly, in Cook v. Carlson,5 a federal district court upheld
from constitutional attack the South Dakota mechanics' and materi-
almen's liens statute.52 The court's reasoning in Cook paralleled the
Spielman-Fond analysis 3 and concluded that the owner's difficulty
in selling or borrowing on the property was slight and not constitu-
tionally cognizable.1 In addition, the court emphasized two factors
which tended to mitigate the amount the property value was dimin-
ished due to the lien.55 First, the improvement wrought by the lienor's
379 F. Supp. at 999-1000.
364 F. Supp. 24 (D.S.D. 1973).
52 Id. at 26-27. See S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 44-9-1 to 49 (1967). In Cook, the
defendant performed work and improved real estate owned by the plaintiff. A dispute
arose as to whether the work was authorized and the defendant filed a mechanics' and
materialmen's lien against the property. The property owner sued, claiming that the
lien procedure provided no notice or opportunity to be heard prior to the attachment
of the lien, thereby depriving her of property without due process of law. The plaintiff
sought to have the lien, and the lien statute declared unconstitutional. Id. at 24-25.
See text accompanying notes 42-50 supra.
364 F. Supp. at 26-27. As in Spielman-Fond, see text accompanying note 50
supra, the precise holding of the court was that the deprivation to the property owner
was "insignificant" so as not to require notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to
attachment of the lien. 364 F. Supp. at 28.
In addition, the Cook court held that circumstances within the construction indus-
try and the need to protect subcontractors and materialmen are such to constitute an
"extraordinary situation" that justifies postponement of a hearing until after the lien
attaches. Id. See Terranova v. Avco Financial Svc., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 1402 (D. Vt.
1975). The Supreme Court has held that where appropriate "extraordinary situations"
do exist, owners can be deprived of significant property interests without notice and
prior opportunity to be heard. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 (1972). The Court,
however, has set out strict guidelines as to what constitutes an extraordinary situation.
In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the Court stated that such requirements are
met only if: (1) the seizure is directly necessary to secure an important governmental
or general public interest; (2) there is a special need for prompt action; and (3) the
state has kept strict control of such seizures and where they are conducted by a public
official responsible for determining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute,
that it was necessary and justified in a particular instance. Id. at 91.
A review of the Supreme Court decisions in which the extraordinary situations
exception has been applied, however, reveals that mechanics' liens statutes do not fall
within that realm. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663
(1974)(seizure of yacht transporting marijuana); Ewing v. Myfinger & Casselberry,
Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950)(misbranded drugs); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245
(1947) (bank failure). See also Hutchinson v. Bank of North Carolina, 392 F. Supp. 888
(M.D.N.C. 1975); Catz, supra note 30, at 555-56; Pearson, Due Process and the Debtor:
The Impact of Mitchell v. W. T. Grant, 29 OKuA. L. Rlv. 277, 309-11 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as Pearson]; Steinheimer, supra note 7, at 89-96.
364 F. Supp. at 27.
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efforts would increase the property's value, thereby minimizing any
harm to the owner." Second, the court stressed the availability of an
expeditious hearing on the merits after the lien filing which would
decrease the time period during which the lien remained an encumbr-
ance of record.5 7
Those courts adopting the insignificant deprivation of interest
analysis" arguably either have ignored the practical realities of the
construction and finance industries or have made a forced choice
between upholding the mechanics' liens statutes or construing due
process as mandating unattractive procedural requirements. First,
mechanics' liens do not prevent the owner from using or alienating
his property in an absolute sense since mechanics' liens are nonpos-
51 Id. The reasoning that the increased property value due to the lien claimant's
services offsets the owner's deprivation is tenuous. First, that analysis assumes an
equality between the increased property value and the decrease in the owner's equity
due to the perfected lien. That assumption is in no way axiomatic, particularly in
states where lien claims can exceed the market value of the improved property. See
text accompanying note 6 supra. Second, the theory assumes that eventually statutory
procedural prerequisites such as timeliness of filing and foreclosure actions have or will
be met. Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. at 24, 353 A.2d at
228. Finally, that analysis assumes the underlying validity of the lien: the very issue
precipitating the dispute. Id. In granting mechanics' liens to those who improve real
property through their materials and services, statutory schemes must allow liens to
attach without prior notice to the owner and a hearing. See text accompanying notes
126-137 infra. In this sense, the process does assume the validity of lien claims. How-
ever, legislatures did not give presumptive validity to claims of liens on a factual basis.
Legislatures, in effect, granted a cause of action to insure sufficient funds are available
to satisfy claims which later prove valid in a specific amount. However, to argue that
an owner is not deprived of a significant interest because the deprivation to the owner
is offset by the increase in property value assumes not only the validity of the lien in
the manner necessary to protect lien claimants but additionally the substantive valid-
ity of the lien on a factual level. Under normal circumstances, an owner does not
challenge the mechanics' lien claimant's statutory right to file a claim of lien but
disputes the merits of the claim, such as the claimant's factual right to a lien on the
owner's property for work or materials purportedly furnished or the claimant's factual
allegation that he is owed a particular amount. See Comment, The Constitutional
Validity of Mechanics' Liens Under the Due Process Clause-A Reexamination After
Mitchell and North Georgia, 55 B.U.L. Rxv. 263, 274 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Constitutional Validity].
51 364 F. Supp. at 27-28. The availability of an immediate post-seizure hearing
concerning the substantive validity of the mechanics' lien is a proper factor in analyz-
ing what due process requires. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610
(1974). Consideration of what procedures due process requires, however, is premature
in assessing whether any due process protection must be accorded in view of the
owner's property interest.
m See cases cited in note 49 supra.
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sessory.5 1 Nevertheless, the existence of a perfected mechanics' lien
as an encumbrance of record"0 will reduce the value for which the
property can be sold.6 In states which do not limit the owner's liabil-
ity for mechanics' liens, lien claims may exceed the full market value
of the property, " rendering the property unmarketable.13 While the
property owner ultimately may prevail on the merits against the lien
claimant, the owner would be denied the use of his potential sale
funds pending that event."
Furthermore, perfected mechanics' liens also deprive property
owners of the right to encumber their property. 5 Often, financing
1' Since mechanics' liens are non-possessory claims against the owner's property,
the property remains in the owner's possession until a lien is judicially foreclosed. An
appealing argument has been made, however, that mechanics' liens do totally deprive
the property owner of the use of his property in the same manner as does a garnishment
of wages. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), possibly the
paramount deprivation was not the actual garnishment of wages but the deprivation
of the ability to dispose of the wages to satisfy the wage earner's wants and needs.
Similarly, the deprivation of the ability freely to dispose of the property may be the
only significant incident of real property ownership. Comment, Sniadach, Overmyer,
and Fuentes: Problems for the Mechanics' Lien and Protection for Real Property
Developers, 1973 LAW AND SOC. ORD. 497, 504-05 [hereinafter cited as LAW AND SOC.
ORD.]. See Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); text accompanying notes 71-74 infra.
" See LAW AND Soc. ORD., supra note 59, at 504.
"1 Presumalily, purchasers would be unwilling to pay the full unencumbered mar-
ket value for property which is subject to outstanding mechanics' liens, but rather
would deduct the amount of liens claimed from the purchase price. See Hutchinson v.
Bank of North Carolina, 392 F. Supp. 888, 898 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Cook v. Carlson, 364
F. Supp. 24, 27 (D.S.D. 1973); Roundhouse Constr. Co. v. Telesco Masons Supp. Co.,
168 Conn. 371, 362 A.2d 778, vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975); reinstated, - Conn. -,
365 A.2d 393 (1976); Barry Properties, Inc. v. Pick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 24,
353 A.2d 228, 228 (1976); Constitutional Validity, supra note 56, at 269; LAw AND SOC.
ORD., supra note 59, at 503-04.
62 See text accompanying note 6 supra; Comment, Mechanics' Liens-Potential
Pitfall for the Homeowner, 62 Ky. L.J. 278, 279-80 & n.20 (1973).
63 See Constitutional Validity, supra note 56, at 274-75.
64 Id. In addition to the decreased market value, the time, effort, and money which
a property owner may have to spend to have the lien dissolved might, in themselves,
be a property interest requiring due process protections. See Pearson, supra note 54,
at 310.
'1 See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), in which the Court stated that
property is more than the physical thing which a person owns. Property includes "the
right to acquire, use, and dispose of it [and] [t]he Constitution protects all these
essential attributes of property." Id. at 74. Accord, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10
(1948). See Bay State Harness Horse Racing & Breeding Ass'n v. PPG Indus., Inc.,
365 F. Supp. 1299, 1304-05 (D. Mass. 1973)(prejudgment real estate attachment which
restricts owner's ability to sell or mortgage property at full value is deprivation of
constitutionally significant interest); Gunter v. Merchants Warren Nat'l Bank, 360 F.
MECHANICS' LIENS
conditions require that property be free of all liens and encumbr-
ances. " The presence of a lien in that situation would prevent the
closing of a permanent mortgage." More importantly, as in Barry
Properties, perfected liens may prevent the owner from refinancing a
project through a secondary mortgage to continue construction.68
Thus, the Spielman-Fond and Cook courts' conclusion that mechan-
ics' liens deprive property owners of no significant interest seems to
ignore economic practicalities.
An alternative explanation of the Spielman-Fond insignificant
interest theory is that the analysis reflects a forced choice between
invalidating mechanics' liens statutes on due process grounds and
the cumbersome procedure of requiring notice to the owner and a
hearing before liens could attach. 69 At the time of the Spielman-
Fond and Cook decisions, Supreme Court precedent apparently
mandated such an either-or choice, since they were decided after
the Supreme Court rendered decisions in Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corp. and Fuentes v. Shevin, but before the decision in Mitchell v.
W. T. Grant Co.70 In Sniadach, the Supreme Court invalidated a
Supp. 1085, 1090 (D. Me. 1973)(prejudgment real estate attachment which deprives
owner's ability to convey clear title is deprivation of constitutionally significant inter-
est); Roundhouse Constr. Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supp. Co., 168 Conn. 371, 362 A.2d
778, 784-85 (recording of mechanics' lien which restricts owner's opportunity to alien-
ate property is deprivation of constitutionally significant interest), vacated on other
grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), reinstated, - Conn. _ , 365 A.2d 393 (1976); cf.
Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 88-90 (1962)(noise from aircraft at nearby
airport was a "taking" of homeowner's property in constitutional sense).1 Cf. 12 C.F.R. § 7.2040(d)(1)(1976)(liens which do not affect value or use of real
estate include construction liens not yet filed).
17 See, e.g., Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 21, 353
A.2d 222 (1976); Gauntlett Equip. Co. v. Hollander, Mechanics' Lien Docket No. 1204
(C.P. No. 6, Philadelphia County, Sept. 27, 1966), discussed in Ominsky, supra note
21, at 234-36.
18 277 Md. at 15, 353 A.2d at 222. The secondary mortgage would be junior in
priority to all perfected mechanics' liens and to any first mortgages. See, e.g., W. VA.
CODE § 38-2-17 (Cum. Supp. 1976)(lien shall have priority over any other lien secured
by deed of trust or otherwise created subsequent to date labor or materials furnished).
Most lenders apparently would be unwilling to accept such an encumbered debtor. See
Ominsky, supra note 21, at 238. Thus, if the owner faces continued work stoppages for
lack of financing and a foreclosure suit by lien claimants, the pressures for settlement
could well outweigh the owner's honest belief that the liens are invalid. See generally
Ominsky, supra note 21, at 238-40; LAw AND Soc. ORD., supra note 59, at 511-13.
"1 Compare Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997 (D. Ariz.
1973) and Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24 (D.S.D. 1973) with Ruocco v. Brinker, 380
F. Supp. 432 (S.D. Fla. 1974) and Roundhouse Constr. Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supp.
Co., 168 Conn. 371, 362 A.2d 778 (1975).
70 The chronological order of these decisions is: Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Cook v. Carlson, 364 F.
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Wisconsin garnishment statute which permitted prejudgment gar-
nishment of wages."' Emphasizing the flexible nature of due process"
and the potential hardship to wage earners in such a garnishment
system,73 the Court held the statute unconstitutional for failing to
provide wage earners with notice and a hearing prior to the garnish-
ment. 4 Fuentes, which struck down the Florida and Pennsylvania
replevin statutes, 5 seemingly extended the absolute requirement of
notice and prior hearing to property interests other than wages. The
Fuentes Court strongly emphasized that the central meaning of pro-
cedural due process is the right to notice and opportunity to be heard
prior to a property deprivation.77 Thus, at the time of the Spielman-
Fond and Cook decisions, the law seemed to mandate that notice and
a prior hearing must be afforded a property owner if a significant
property interest were involved.
78
The disadvantages of the notice and hearing requirement were
apparent. First, upon a judicial declaration of a lien statute's uncon-
stitutionality for lack or procedural requirements, contractors, sub-
contractors, materialmen, and laborers would be unprotected until
Supp. 24 (D.S.D. 1973); Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 997 (D.
Ariz. 1973); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
1' 395 U.S. at 338-39, 342. The Wisconsin garnishment statute provided a sum-
mary prejudgment garnishment procedure whereby, without notice and a prior hear-
ing, a worker's wages could be frozen in the interim between garnishment and culmina-
tion of the main suit. 395 U.S. at 338-39.
72 Id. at 340.
" Id. at 341-42.
74 Id.
11 407 U.S. at 96. In the eponymic case the Fuentes Court noted that in conform-
ance with Florida procedure, a vendor selling goods under an installment sales contract
had only to file summary allegations with the clerk of the small-claims court and a
writ of replevin would issue without notice to the vendee or an opportunity to be heard.
Similarly, in a case combined for appeal, the Pennsylvania replevin in statute provided
for summary writs of replevin without notice or a prior hearing. The Pennsylvania
statute did require the party seeking the writ to post a bond in double the value of the
property to be seized. The statute, however, did not require that there ever be an
opportunity for a hearing on the merits of the 'claim. Id. at 70-71, 77.
7 Following the decision in Sniadach there was a split of authority as to whether
that case was limited to deprivations of wages as a specialized form of property or
applied to other types of property as well. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 72-73
n.5 (1972), and cases cited therein.
77 407 U.S. at 80-82.
7' The Court in Fuentes reiterated that where extraordinary circumstances exist,
there may be deprivations of property without notice or prior hearing, but that such
cases must be "truly unusual." 407 U.S. at 90-92 and n.22. See text accompanying note
54 supra.
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the legislature could enact new statutes. 9 Second, the legislative pur-
pose of mechanics' liens statutes was to afford protection or security
to artisans improving another's property by their efforts. 0 Prior no-
tice of an intent to claim a lien would enable property owners to
alienate or encumber their property so as to defeat or diminish that
protection.8 1 Thus, while the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,5 which held that alternative procedural
safeguards in lieu of a prior hearing could satisfy due process, made
this forced choice unnecessary,m the Spielman-Fond and Cook deci-
sions may represent merely the lower courts' practical solution to the
temporary dilemma.84 Whatever the underlying bases of those deci-
7' While some group or individual is often left unprotected when a statute is
declared unconstitutional, those persons in the construction industry have tradition-
ally been afforded special protection. Indeed, the court in Cook detailed the
"particularly vulnerable position" of labor and material contractors and emphasized
their importance to the stability of the economy. 364 F. Supp. at 29 (credit risks are
greater as labor and materials contractors extend bigger blocks of credit, have more
riding on one transaction, have more people vitally dependent upon eventual payment,
and have more to lose in the event of default). Of course, contract remedies still would
be available, as evidenced by the mechanics' liens statutes themselves which typically
provide that the statutory mechanics' liens provisions in no way impair the rights of
the lienor to bring any civil action to which he may be entitled. See, e.g., S.C. CODE
§ 45-292 (1962); VA. CODE § 43-23.2 (1976). However, if legislators had deemed such
contract remedies adequate, there would be no need for mechanics' liens statutes
whatsoever.
See text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
" See 416 U.S. at 605, 609; Constitutional Validity, supra note 56, at 280; LAw
AND SOC. ORD., supra note 59, at 507.
92 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
" See text accompanying notes 91-102 infra.
8, This rationale, of course, does not explain those decisions handed down by lower
courts after Mitchell, to the effect that deprivations caused by mechanics' liens and
similar real estate attachments are not significant interests protected by the fourteenth
amendment. See In re Northwest Homes of Chehalis, Inc., 526 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 907 (1976); In re Thomas A. Cary, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 667,
670-71 (E.D. Va. 1976); In re The Oronoka, 393 F. Supp. 1311 (D. Me. 1975); Brook
Hollow Assocs. v. J. E. Greene, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 1322, 1326-27 (D. Conn. 1975). All
those decisions, however, placed great weight upon or felt bound by the Supreme
Court's summary affirmance of Spielman-Fond, Inc. v. Hanson's, Inc., 417 U.S. 901
(1974). See, e.g., In re Thomas A. Cary, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 667, 670-71 (E.D. Va. 1976);
In re Northwest Homes of Chehalis, Inc., 526 F.2d 505, 506 (9th Cir. 1975).
While the Supreme Court's summary affirmance is a decision on the merits, Ohio
ex rel. Eaton v. Price, 360 U.S. 246, 247 (1959), such a decision is not of the same
precedential value as a Court opinion treating the question on the merits. Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974). See Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 388-89 n.15
(1975) (district court in interpreting Supreme Court's summary affirmance "should not
have felt precluded from undertaking a more precise analysis of the issue"); Id. at 391-
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sions, the Maryland Supreme Court in Barry Properties, on what
seems sounder analysis, determined that they were incorrect.5
92 (Burger, C. J., concurring) (summary affirmance, without opinion, of judgment of
three-judge district court, affirms the judgment but not necessarily the reasoning by
which it was reached; upon fuller consideration of issue under plenary review, Court
has not hesitated to discard rule which a line of summary affirmances may appear to
have established). This is especially applicable when the Court is dealing directly with
questions of constitutional law. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 670-71 & n.14 (1974).
Thus, in an area of due process requiring a balancing of several complex factors and a
variety of interests, the summary affirmance of Spielman-Fond should be accorded
limited precedential authority. See Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co.,
277 Md. 15, 33-35, 353 A.2d 222, 233 (1976); Constitutional Validity, supra note 56, at
272 n.67. Moreover, given the variety among state mechanics' lien statutes, the sum-
mary affirmance of Spielman-Fond may be limited to the particular statutory scheme
in question. If so, other states are free to interpret different statutes without regard to
Spielman-Fond. Cf. Roundhouse Constr. Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supp. Co., 168
Conn. 371, 362 A.2d 778, 783 (1975)(attempting to distinguish Spielman-Fond on its
facts). See also Pearson, supra note 54, at 304-09 (Spielman-Fond was wrong).
" 277 Md. at 23-24, 353 A.2d at 228. By basing its decision on the due process
provisions of both the federal and state constitutions, see text accompanying note 25
supra, the Maryland court effectively insulated Barry Properties from appeal. The
Supreme Court has held that it will not review judgments of state courts which rest
on adequate and independent state grounds. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-
36 (1945); Klinger v. Missouri, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 257, 263 (1871). See generally Note,
The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in the Supreme Court, 74 HARv. L. REv. 1375
(1961). Even where a state court has decided both a federal and a state question, the
Court is said to lack jurisdiction to review the case where the decision was supportable
on the basis of the state question alone. See Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm.,
379 U.S. 487 (1965); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); Murdock v. City of Mem-
phis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
CouRTs § 107, at 543 (3d ed. 1976). Moreover, as long as the minimal safeguards
guaranteed by the federal constitution are satisfied, a state may require a higher
standard of constitutional protection. See Falk, Forward-The State Constitution: A
More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAL. L. REV. 273, 275-82 (1973); Note,
The Untenable Nonfederal Ground in the Supreme Court, 74 HAiv. L. REV. 1375
(1961). Cf. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977)(noting and encouraging recent practice of state courts
construing state constitutions as guaranteeing citizens more protection than required
by federal constitution). Since Barry Properties arguably was based on the Maryland
Declaration of Rights, the decision can be read as holding that the mechanics' lien
statutory scheme provides insufficient procedural safeguards as required by the state
constitution. 277 Md. at 33, 353 A.2d at 233. Because the Maryland court speaks with
final authority on questions of state law, Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 689 (1975),
the holding was based on independent state grounds and Supreme Court review is
consequently precluded. See Roundhouse Constr. Co. v. Telesco Masons Supp. Co.,
168 Conn. 371, 362 A.2d 778 (Connecticut mechanics' lien statute unconstitutional),
vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975)(remanded for clarification of whether judgment based
upon federal or state constitutional grounds, or both), reinstated, - Conn. - , 365
A.2d 393 (1976)(based on both constitutions); Note, Due Process in Pre-Judgment
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Having determined that the existence of a perfected mechanics'
lien constitutes a deprivation of a significant property interest88
through state action 7 demanding due process protection, the court in
Barry Properties turned to the question of what procedures would
satisfy the requirements of due process. The Maryland court looked
primarily to four Supreme Court decisions involving prejudgment
creditors' remedies-Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell v. W. T. Grant
Co., 88 and North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc."5
Following the Sniadach and Fuentes decisions, fourteenth amend-
ment due process apparently required that once a significant prop-
erty interest potentially was affected, notice and a hearing were nec-
essary prior to any deprivation." In 1974, however, the Supreme
Court decided Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co. 1 which emphasized the
dual interests in the property of the vendee-debtor and the vendor-
creditor.2 In Mitchell, the Court examined a Louisiana statute which
Remedies-Invalidation of the Connecticut Mechanics' Lien Statute: Roundhouse
Construction Corporation v. Telesco Masons Supplies Co., 8 CoiqN. L. REv. 744, 744-
45 (1976).
Arguably, a state mechanics' lien statute which includes procedural protections
to the property owner and not to the lien claimant would not satisfy federal due process
guidelines. Following Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), prejudgment
creditors' remedies apparently must provide procedural safeguards for the creditor as
well as the debtor to meet federal due process requirements. See text accompanying
note 92 infra. However, any state procedural requirements which go beyond federally
mandated due process protections and which reflect a constitutional accommodation
of the dual interests of the debtor and creditor would constitute an adequate indepen-
,dent state basis for a decision, thereby insulating the state court decision from appeal
to the United States Supreme Court.
The precedential value of such a decision based on state procedural requirements,
however, would be limited. A federal court construing a different state's statute or a
court from another state could distinguish such a holding as confined to the other
state's stricter requirements. Nevertheless, the Maryland court's reliance solely on
Supreme Court precedent and the express holding that Barry Properties rested on the
requirements of both the federal and state constitutions which were deemed synony-
mous, should render the case persuasive in other jurisdictions.
" See text accompanying notes 36-40 supra.
"7 See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
" See text accompanying notes 91-102 infra.
- 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
11 See text accompanying notes 69-79 supra.
" 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
92 Id. at 604. The vendee-debtor's interest in the goods was obviously the right not
to be wrongfully deprived of the use or possession of the property. Id. The vendor-
creditor's interest in the property was characterized as the protection of his security
interest against deterioration due to time or against wrongful destruction or alienation
of the property by the vendee in possession. Id. at 608. See Catz, supra note 30, at 556-
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permitted the sequestration of personalty to enforce a vendor's lien
of a creditor who sold goods under an installment contract." Although
there were no provisions for notice or a hearing prior to seizure of the
property, the Court sustained the constitutional validity of the stat-
ute. 4
Retreating from the earlier holdings that notice and a hearing
were absolute prerequisites, the Court stressed several alternative
procedural safeguards designed to prevent wrongful deprivations of
debtors' property. 5 First, the Louisiana statute provided that the
writ of sequestration could not issue on the bare conclusory allega-
tions of the claimant. Rather, the complaint must include an affida-
vit specifying the facts supporting the claim." Second, the clear
showing of entitlement evinced in the complaint and affidavit must
be made to a judge and not to a mere court functionary. 7 Third, the
statute provided for an immediate post-seizure hearing in which the
creditor must prove the validity of his claim or have it dissolved.
The Mitchell Court also noted that the validity of the claim under
the Louisiana statute was easily susceptible to documentary proof,
thus reducing the chances of a wrongful deprivation.9 Moreover, in
order for the writ to issue, the creditor was required to file a bond to
compensate the debtor for any harm suffered from unjustified sei-
zure.' The debtor, too, could post a bond and thereby release his
property from the writ.91' By means of these alternative procedural
safeguards, the Court found that the statute reflected a
"constitutional accommodation" of competing interests of the debtor





59. See generally Rendleman, Analyzing the Debtor's Due Process Interest, 17 WM. &
MARY L. Rav. 35 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Rendleman]; Steinheimer, supra note
7, at 85-88.
416 U.S. at 601.
, Id. at 619-20.
'5 Id. at 605-18.
" The statute provided that the writ of sequestration would issue only when" 'the
nature of the claim and the amount thereof and the grounds relied upon for the
issuance of the writ clearly appear from specific facts' shown by a verified petition or
affidavit." Id. at 605, quoting LA. CODE CiV. PRo. ANN., art. 3501 (West 1961).
11 416 U.S. at 605-06.
" Id. at-606.
" Id. at 617-18. The Court noted that the facts relevant to obtaining a writ of
sequestration are narrowly confined to the uncomplicated matters of establishing the
existence of a debt, a vendor's lien and the default and are particularly suited to a
preliminary ex parte determination. Id. at 609, 617-18.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 607 & n.9.
10 Id. at 607.
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Two years later, the Court handed down a fourth decision relating
to prejudgment creditors' remedies 03 Following Mitchell, there was
considerable question as to the constitutional validity of providing
alternative safeguards in lieu of a pre-seizure hearing in areas where
there was no dual debtor-creditor interest in the property to be
seized. 104 To a large extent, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem,
Inc."5 resolved that issue. North Georgia involved a constitutional
challenge to a Georgia garnishment statute. The Georgia statute au-
thorized prejudgment garnishment of wages upon the execution by
the creditor or his attorney of an affidavit before a court clerk. The
application had to state only the amount claimed to be owed and the
applicant's reason for fearing the loss of the debt unless the writ
issued.' The only other prerequisite to issuance was that the creditor
file a bond, equal to twice the amount of the claim to protect the
debtor.0 7 North Georgia dispelled any notion that the Mitchell analy-
sis applied only to secured transactions and that Fuentes would une-
quivocablyll require a prior hearing when the creditor had no prior
interest in the property to be seized.' In North Georgia, the Court
took the clear language of Fuentes, which stated that notice and prior
hearing would be required, and added the alternative procedural
safeguards analysis of Mitchell. "I Indeed, the Court in North Georgia
did not even discuss the absence of a pre-seizure hearing."' Instead,
the decision examined the Georgia garnishment statute for alterna-
tive safeguards to protect debtor-property owners from wrongful dis-
possession.
, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
"' See Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432, 436 n.21 (S.D. Fla. 1974); 63 GEO.
L.J. 1337, 1340 n.30 (1975), and materials cited therein.
419 U.S. 601 (1975).
lO Id. at 602-03. See note 96 supra.
419 U.S. at 603.
"' The Court in Fuentes did provide for postponement of notice and hearing where
the requirements of the extraordinary situations exception are met. 407 U.S. at 91. See
note 54 supra.
"IG If the Court had intended that the alternative safeguard analysis undertaken
in Mitchell would apply only in cases of secured transactions, the North Georgia
decision could have distinguished Mitchell on that basis alone. See Catz, supra note
30, at 563-64; Note, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 494, 505 (1976). But see Rendleman, supra note
92, at 43-45.
11* Compare Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83-84 (1972)(existence of other safe-
guards may-affect form of hearing but do not "obviate the right to a prior hearing of
some kind") with North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 606
(1975)(statute invalid for permitting deprivations "without opportunity for hearing or
other safeguard[s]").
"I See 419 U.S. 601.
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On that basis, the Court found the Georgia statute unconstitu-
tional, having none of the "saving characteristics" of the Louisiana
statute upheld in Mitchell."2 The North Georgia Court, however,
then discussed the Georgia statute with regard to only three of the
several procedural safeguards noted in Mitchell. " First, the Georgia
writ of garnishment was issuable upon the affidavit of a creditor's
attorney, who need not have personal knowledge of the facts support-
ing the claim, containing only conclusory allegations."' Second, the
writ was issuable by a court clerk, without participation by a judge." 5
Third, the statute contained no provision for an early post-
garnishment hearing at which the creditor would be required to dem-
onstrate at least probable cause for the garnishment."' Moreover, the
availability of bonding procedures by whi6h a debtor could release his
property from the writ, without the other safeguards, was held not to
be a sufficient safeguard to satisfy due process standards."7
A combined reading of Sniadach, Fuentes, Mitchell, and North
Georgia suggests that procedural due process requires notice and a
hearing prior to any significant deprivation of property, unless ade-
quate procedural safeguards are present."8 Until the Supreme Court
hears challenges to creditors' remedies statutes in which one or an-
other of the Mitchell and North Georgia alternative procedural safe-
guards is absent, how many or which procedures are necessary re-
mains uncertain."' Various combinations of alternative safeguards
" Id. at 607.
" See text accompanying notes 95-102 supra.
"' 419 U.S. at 607. The writ, however, also could issue on the affidavit of the
creditor who would have personal knowledge of the factual basis of the claim. Id.
" Id.
116 Id.
"' Id. at 607-08. Cf. Hutchinson v. Bank of North Carolina, 392 F. Supp. 888, 898
(M.D.N.C. 19'15)(bonding procedures will not save an otherwise invalid statute from
constitutional challenge). The North Georgia Court's discussion of the Georgia stat-
ute's bonding procedures was segregated from its analysis of the "saving characteris-
tics" in Mitchell. 419 U.S. 606, 607. Such a treatment casts doubt upon whether the
Court would consider the opportunity to substitute surety bonds or cash for seized
property as a redeeming procedural safeguard under any circumstances. Moreover,
North Georgia did not discuss the susceptibility of the claim to documentary proof.
419 U.S. 601. Whether that omission was meant to remove that factor from the list of
minimal alternative safeguards is unclear.
"I See Ruocco v. Brinker, 380 F. Supp. 432, 437 (S.D. Fla. 1974); Connolly Dev.,
Inc. v. Superior Ct. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 803, 553 P.2d 637, 132 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1976);
Roundhouse Constr. Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supp. Co., 168 Conn. 371, 362 A.2d 778,
783-84 (1975); Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 30, 353 A.2d
222, 231 (1976).
"' See Hutchinson v. Bank of North Carolina, 392 F. Supp. 888 (M.D.N.C.
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seemingly would suffice for different prejudgment creditors' reme-
dies. The particular combination which would afford adequate due
process protection in any specific substantive area wherein an owner
is deprived of his property, however, must reflect an analysis of and
an accommodation among the interests involved.
2
1
Assessing the Maryland mechanics' lien statute in view of the
Mitchell and North Georgia decisions, the court in Barry Properties
found the Maryland statutory procedures lacking in adequate alter-
native safeguards.'2 ' The court noted that the lien attached as soon
as work commenced, with no requirement that the claimant provide
an affidavit on personal knowledge setting forth the facts underlying
his claim, file a bond to protect the property owner, submit the lien
to judicial scrutiny, or prove the validity of his claim in a prompt
post-attachment hearing.2 2 Even when the lien is perfected by filing
within the 180 day period,' the statute provided that the subcontrac-
tor need only present the claim to a court clerk for recordation with-
out any requirement that the filing be accompanied by an affidavit
or bond or be subjected to prior judicial examination. 4 Thus, since
the statutory scheme required no prior hearing and lacked alternative
safeguards, the Maryland court declared the statute unconstitutional
under both the federal and state constitutions.
5
1975)(lack of prior notice and hearing and issuance of writ of attachment by court
clerk, in light of other safeguards, did not render statute unconstitutional); Sugar v.
Curtis Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643, 647-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)(all five Mitchell
safeguards necessary).
416 U.S. at 607-10.
2 277 Md. at 32-33; 353 A.2d at 232-33.
2 Id. at 31-32, 353 A.2d at 232.
' See text accompanying note 16 supra.
121 277 Md. at 32, 353 A.2d at 232.
"1 Id. at 32, 353 A.2d at 233. Having declared the statute unconstitutional, how-
ever, the Maryland court concluded that the property owner, Barry Properties, Inc.,
was not unconstitutionally deprived of his property without due process of law. Id. at
35-37, 353 A.2d at 235. The majority reasoned that only the unconstitutional portions
of the statute which provided for the taking of property without sufficient procedural
safeguards need be severed from the statutory scheme. The court held that the excis-
ing of the unconstitutional aspects could be accomplished in such a way as to retain
the primary legislative intent of giving additional protection to contractors, material-
men, and laborers. Id. at 35-37, 353 A.2d at 234-35. The court concluded that the
remaining portions of the mechanics' lien statute gave lien claimants a chose in action
rather than an existing lien on the improved property. Id. at 37, 353 A.2d at 236. In
the final paragraph of the opinion, which the dissent termed the majority's "own brand
of wizardry," id. at 40, 353 A.2d at 237 (Levine, J., dissenting), the court noted that
Barry Properties knew of Fick Brothers' claim of a lien before the initiation of the
enforcement suit. Thus, since Barry Properties did not challenge the constitutionality
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The Maryland court correctly assessed the due process protec-
tions of that state's statute as inadequate. Given the variety of state
mechanics' liens provisions, however, the precedential value of such
state court decisions construing particular state statutes is limited.
Nevertheless, a review of the Mitchell-North Georgia procedures does
provide helpful guidelines.
Initially, due process requires that some hearing must occur at a
meaningful time in a meaningful manner given the particular credi-
tor remedy.', Upon initial analysis, a hearing prior to any deprivation
seemingly would suffice in all cases. Mechanics' liens, however,
closely resemble secured transactions in which the dual interests of




of the lien statute until the enforcement suit began, the court reasoned that Barry
Properties was not deprived of any property interest prior to the lower court's determi-
nation that the lien was valid. 277 Md. at 38, 353 A.2d at 235-36. The dissent agreed
that the statute was unconstitutional but argued that the property owner was either
deprived of due process or not. The dissent would have applied the rule of judicial
restraint and refrained from deciding constitutional issues if the same result could have
been achieved on other grounds. If constitutional protection was present, the dissent
argued that the decision should have been dispositive and there should have been no
holding that the statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 40-41, 353 A.2d at 237 (Levine,
J., dissenting).
The disagreement between the majority and dissenting opinion seems to center
on how much of the statutory scheme was deemed unconstitutional. The dissent
argued that the entire statute should fall for lack of procedural due process while the
majority viewed only those provisions which provided for attachment and perfection
of a lien prior to a judicial hearing as void. While their reasoning is somewhat circui-
tous, the majority may well have been attempting to provide an equitable result for
the parties before it in the face of a statute that was unconstitutional in its procedural
protections. See text accompanying notes 69-84 supra.
The Maryland legislature acted quickly to insure protection for persons providing
labor and materials for the improvement of real property. Within three months of the
decision in Barry Properties, the legislature passed a revised mechanics' lien law reme-
dying the defects noted by the state supreme court. See MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE ANN.
§§ 9-101 to 112 (Cum. Supp. 1976). Among the more pertinent changes were greater
factual specificity required in the notice to the property owner of an intent to claim a
lien and in the filing of a lien, id. at §§ 9-104 to 105, filing by a lien claimant of an
affidavit setting forth facts supporting his claim, id. at § 9-105, apd including an
automatic post-filing judicial review of the documents on file and a hearing in which
the owner can contest the claim if the initial review indicates a potentially valid claim.
Id. at § 9-106.
"I' See 419 U.S. 606; Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971); Boddie v. Connecti-
cut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
I" In both secured agreements and mechanics' liens the creditor and the debtor
each have a present interest in specific property so that chances of a wrongful or
mistaken seizure are reduced. See Pearson, supra note 54, at 297, 300-01, 309; Rendle-
man, supra note 92, at 40-44. Furthermore, a creditor's right in the collateral is usually
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Notice and a prior hearing would certainly protect the property owner
from wrongful deprivation. To be effective, however, the lien claim-
ant's interest created by the statute apparently requires a hearing
only after a claim of lien has been filed. Otherwise, upon advance
notice, property owners could alienate or encumber their property so
as to destroy the protection sought for contractors and laborers.2 8
Indeed, this possibility was the apparent motive behind the
Spielman-Fond and Cook decisions.' 9 Statutory provisions prevent-
ing this ocurrence by giving mechanics' liens priority over all credi-
tors subsequent to the commencement of work' 0 do not solve the
problem. States also have an interest in the integrity of their record-
ing systems and an obligation to protect subsequent purchasers and
creditors from unrecorded encumbrances.'2 ' Mechanics' liens which
relate back to the time when the first work was performed or materi-
als supplied' 2 need not be recorded until after the work is completed
and a hearing held to determine the validity of the lien.'2 2
A hearing immediately following the perfection of a lien would
better accommodate the various interests surrounding mechanics'
liens.' 4 Contractors, subcontractors, materialmen, and laborers
would enjoy the statutory protection of receiving a specific lien on
property improved through their efforts. Although property owners
would find it difficult to dispose of, or encumber, their property with
the lien on record,' an immediate post-filing hearing in which the
detailed in the security agreement while a lien claimant's rights are set out in statutory
form and in filing requirements, making them both readily susceptible to documentary
proof. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 609 (1974); Catz, supra note 30,
at 565.
'= See 416 U.S. at 605, 609; text accompanying note 81 supra.
'' See text accompanying notes 69-85 supra. The potential effect of alienation or
encumbrance in eliminating statutory protection for creditors also was a major factor
in the Mitchell decision. See 416 U.S. at 605, 609.
"a E.g., W. VA. CODE § 38-2-17 (Cum. Supp. 1976); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 713.07 (West
1969).
11, See Cook v. Carlson, 364 F. Supp. 24, 27 (D.S.D. 1973).
"1 See text accompanying note 16 supra.
132 Any prior recordation would result in the same problem faced in Barry
Properties, in that a lien on record would deprive the owner of the ability to alienate
his property freely. See text accompanying notes 36-40 supra. See generally Constitu-
tional Validity, supra note 56, at 279-84.
13 See MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE ANN. § 9-106 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
', Under the revised Maryland statute, there must be a judicial review of a peti-
tion to establish a mechanics' lien. As under the prior statute, this petition must be
filed with the county clerk within 180 days of completing work. Id. at § 9-105. If the
court determines that the lien should attach, it shall order the owner to show cause
within 15 days why the lien should not attach. Id. at § 9-106(a).
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claimant must prove the validity of the claim or have it dissolved
3
would remove the extended deprivation of the owner's ability freely
to alienate or encumber his property by a potentially invalid lien.
Finally, subsequent purchasers and potential lenders would need
only await the outcome of the prompt post-perfection hearing to de-
termine the validity of lien claims.'
Although the importance of requiring more than conclusory alle-
gations in order for the lien to attach' 3 is diminished by a prompt
post-perfection hearing, requiring a sworn affidavit containing de-
tailed factual bases of a claim would serve several purposes. First, if
required to be served on the property owner as well as recorded in
public property records, the affidavit could function as proper notice
to the owner, not only of the substance of the claim,'3 ' but also of the
time of the appropriate hearing. The factual information also would
allow potential purchasers and lenders to evaluate independently the
merits of the claim,"'4 thus further lessening the period in which alien-
ability or encumbrance would be restricted by patently invalid claims
of liens. Second, requiring more than conclusory allegations would
tend to discourage frivolous claims aimed at pressuring property own-
ers into settling unjustified liens.'' Reducing the potential for frivo-
l" The revised statutory scheme recently established in Maryland results in a
shifting burden of proof between the lien claimant and the property owner. The lien
claimant initially must prove the validity of his claim of lien in the court's review of
the pleadings and documents which the claimant must file. MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE
ANN. § 9-106(a) (Cum. Supp. 1976). In the initial review, the court may require the
claimant to supplement or explain any matters contained in the pleadings. Id. The
court then determines whether the lien shall attach, and, if so, the burden of going
forward shifts to the property owner to show cause why a lien for the specified amount
should not attach. Id. See note 125 supra. The owner may present evidence in his
behalf and controvert any statement of fact in the claimant's documents. MD. [REAL
PROP.] CODE ANN. § 9-106(a)(2)(Cum. Supp. 1976). If the owner's answer shows cause
why a lien should not attach, the court will set the matter for hearing on the merits of
the claim in which the burden of proving the validity of the claim returns to the lien
claimant. Id. at §§ 9-106(a)(2), (3); 9-106(b). At the hearing the court determines
whether the lien should attach as a matter of law and enters an order establishing or
denying the lien. Id. at § 9-106(b)(1), (2). If the court determines that the lien should
not attach as a matter of law but concludes that there is probable cause to believe that
the claimant is entitled to a lien, the court will enter an order of its findings of fact
and set the case for trial within six months. Id. at § 9-106(b)(3). See text accompanying
note 19 supra.
137 See text accompanying note 133 supra.
See 416 U.S. at 605. •
' See, e.g., S.C. CODE § 45-259 (1962)(notice to be served on owner).
11 See Ominsky, supra note 21, at 240.
See generally LAW AND SOC. ORD., supra note 59, at 511-13.
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lous claims would also serve to offset the increase in judicial workload
occasioned by the prompt post-filing hearing.'42 Thus, the various
procedural safeguards which the Supreme Court found sufficient in
Mitchell and wanting in North Georgia can be applied to statutory
mechanics' liens so as to reflect an adequate accommodation of the
competing interests. With this analytical background, a brief assess-
ment of the constitutional validity of mechanics' lien statutes in the
remaining states in the Fourth Circuit 3 can be undertaken:
Initially, not one of the mechanics' lien statutes of North Caro-
lina,'44 South Carolina,'45 Virginia,'46 and West Virginia'47 require no-
tice and a hearing prior to attachment and perfection of the lien. Of
the four states, only Virginia's statute contains provisions for a
prompt post-filing hearing in which the lienor must show the validity
of his lien or have it dissolved.' 8 On this basis alone, the North
Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia statutes probably could
not withstand a constitutional challenge based on due process.'49
"I With regard to other procedural safeguards noted in Mitchell, judicial partici-
pation in the form of an initial assessment of the lien's validity prior to perfection
would be inefficient. When there is an immediate post-filing hearing and recordation
of a lien only on a sworn statement by the claimant including the factual bases of the
claim, judicial involvement probably would not be beneficial. See Constitutional Va-
lidity, supra note 56, at 284-85. Similarly, bonding procedures whereby owners could
release their property from the lien would bring few increased benefits given the protec-
tion of a prompt hearing. In Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), the Supreme Court
noted that when one piece of property is seized and the owner can recover it only if he
surrenders another piece of property, the owner is deprived of his property whether or
not he has the time, the funds, and the knowledge to take advantage of the recovery
procedure. Id. at 85. Thus, an owner whose property is seized subject to a perfected
lien and who then substitutes a bond in its place is still deprived of his property.
Indeed, this deprivation is much more direct than the practical restrictions on his
property occasioned by the mechanics' lien.
Where the post-filing hearing results in a finding of probable validity of a lien
claim, however, an owner's bond could restore the unfettered use of his property pend-
ing a formal foreclosure suit on the merits. A bond requirement after such a hearing
would not be an unconstitutional deprivation of property since the owner had notice
and a hearing on the probable validity of the lien before the bond was required, thus
satisfying due process. See MD. [REL PROP.] CODE ANN. § 9-106(3)(iv)(Cum. Supp.
1976).
"' Excluding Maryland, see note 125 supra, the remaining Fourth Circuit states
are North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia.
' N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44A-7 to 23 (1976).
"' S.C. CODE §§ 45-251 to 293 (1962 & Cum. Supp. 1975).
'" VA. CODE §§ 43-1 to 23.2 (1976).
" W. VA. CODE §§ 38-2-1 to 39 (1966 & Cum. Supp. 1976).
" VA. CODE § 43-17.1 (1976). See text accompanying notes 172-179 supra.
"' The mechanics' lien statutory schemes of North Carolina, South Carolina, and
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The North Carolina mechanics' lien statute provides that a lien 5'
attaches from the time the labor or materials are first furnished.' 5' In
order to preserve and enforce the lien, the claimant must file a claim
of lien within 120 days and bring suit to enforce the lien within 180
days after the last furnishing of labor or materials.'52 While the ab-
sence of any requirement of a prior or post-filing hearing may be fatal,
the allegations required in the claim of lien appear adequate, since
the statute requires that specific and detailed information be in-
cluded in the lien claim.' 3 There is, however, no judicial participation
in the process, and given the lack of an immediate hearing, this is
especially harmful in terms of protecting property owners from
wrongful deprivation. The statute does provide that an owner may
release his property from the lien by depositing cash or a surety bond
West Virginia would probably not satisfy the due process requirements of either the
federal or state constitutions. The due process provisions of the South Carolina and
West Virginia constitutions are nearly identical to the fourteenth amendment. See
S.C. CONST. art. I § 3 (Cum. Supp. 1975); W. VA. CONST. art. III § 10. The due process
provision of the constitution of North Carolina, N. C. CONST. art. I § 19, is similar to
the "Law of the land" provision of the Maryland constitution. See note 25 supra.
Moreover, although the North Carolina Supreme Court has held that although United
States Supreme Court decisions construing the fourteenth amendment are not binding
interpretations of its state constitutional provisions, such decisions would be persu-
asive. Bulova Watch Co. v. Brand Distrib. of North Wilkesboro, Inc., 285 N.C. 467,
206 S.E.2d 141 (1974).
In any event, property owners and lien claimants must be afforded at least the
protections of the fourteenth amendment and the individual state statutes probably
could not satisfy those requirements. See Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974); Barry Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing Co., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222
(1976); Roundhouse Constr. Corp. v. Telesco Masons Supp. Co., 168 Conn. 371, 362
A.2d 778 (1975); text accompanying notes 25, 85 & 126-143 supra.
'" The North Carolina statute grants to "[a]ny person who performs or furnishes
labor or professional design or surveying services or furnishes materials . . . for the
making of any improvement [to real property] . . . a lien on such real property to
secure payment of all debts owing for" such services. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44A-8, 23
(1976). See generally Urban & Miles, Mechanics' Liens for the Improvement of Real
Property: Recent Developments in Perfection, Enforcement, and Priority, 12 WAKE
FOREST L. Rav. 283 (1976).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-10 (1976).
" Id. at §§ 44A-12 to 13. Cf. MD. [REAL PROP.] CODE ANN. § 9-105, 106 (1974 &
Cum. Supp. 1975)(180 days to file claim; one year to bring suit). See also text accompa-
nying notes 139-140 supra.
-5 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-12 (1976). In addition to the names and addresses
of the record property owner and lien claimant, the claim of lien must include a
description of the property, the name and address of the person with whom the claim-
ant contracted, a description of the labor or materials, the dates on which they were
supplied, and the amount claimed.
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in its stead.' 4 Nevertheless, this procedure in no way protects prop-
erty owners from invalid claims or assures a prompt hearing on the
merits of the claim. ' Consequently, this combination of procedural
devices would not seem to meet due process standards for protecting
the interests of both owners and lien claimants.'56
Under the South Carolina statute5 ' the lien arises on commence-
ment of work or the furnishing of materials.'58 A lienor must file a
claim of lien, termed a certificate, within 90 days of the date on which
he last furnished labor or materials and must bring suit to enforce the
lien within six months of completing work.'59 Perfection of the lien
occurs upon filing of the certificate prior to any judicial participa-
tion. '6 The information required in the claim of lien amounts only to
conclusory allegations'' and would probably not be adequate under
Mitchell and North Georgia. While an owner can release his property
from a lien by substituting cash or a bond with the clerk of court,"2
this procedure suffers the same deficiencies as the North Carolina
bonding provisions.6 3 The lack of any prompt hearing, the conclusory
allegations permitted in the filing of a claim of lien, and the absence
of any judicial involvement in the perfection of the lien would likely
render the South Carolina statute constitutionally defective.
Procedural provisions of the West Virginia mechanics' lien stat-
ute64 differ between those who have direct contracts with the prop-
erty owner and those who provide services or materials with no direct
contractual relationship. In general, every lien claimant must file a
claim of lien within 90 days and bring suit to enforce the lien within
I Id. at §§ 44A-16(5),(6). See note 142 supra.
115 See note 142 supra.
"' But cf. Hutchinson v. Bank of North Carolina, 392 F. Supp. 888 (M.D.N.C.
1975) (upholding constitutional validity of North Carolina prejudgment real estate at-
tachment statute similar to mechanics' lien statute where absence of prejudgment
attachment would allow debtor to remove, assign, or dispose of property and defraud
creditors; attachment to secure jurisdiction is an extraordinary situation justifying
postponement of notice and hearing). See note 54 supra.
" S.C. CODE §§ 45-251 to 293 (1962 & Cum. Supp. 1975).
' Wood v. Hardy, 235 S.C. 131, 110 S.E.2d 157 (1959); Williamson v. Hotel
Melrose, 110 S.C. 1, 30, 96 S.E. 407, 414 (1918).
'I" S.C. CODE §§ 45-259, 262 (1962).
"'0 Id. at § 45-259.
" ' In addition to the name of the owner and a description of the property to be
attached, the statute only requires the claim of lien to include a statement of a "just
and true account of the amount due . "Id. See text accompanying notes 139-142
supra.
"2 S.C. CODE § 45-261 (1962).
16 See text accompanying notes 142 & 154-155 supra.
"I4 W. VA. CODE §§ 38-2-1 to 39 (1966 & Cum. Supp. 1976).
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six months after completing his portion of the work.' In addition,
lien claimants having no direct contract with the owner must first
have served on the owner a notice of lien within 60 days of the final
furnishing of labor or materials.' Again, there is no judicial partici-
pation in the filing of the lien and no provision for an immediate post-
perfection hearing. Moreover, no bonding procedures exist whereby
an owner can release his property from a perfected lien.
The information to be contained in the claim of lien, however,
appears adequate for due process purposes. While little is required in
a claim of lien filed by a party with a contract with a property
owner,"7 subcontractors, materialmen, and laborers without such a
contract must include significantly more detail.' Furthermore, the
statute provides that an owner can require such claimants to file more
detailed itemized accounts of work done or materials furnished, in-
cluding the dates those services were performed and the price.'69 Fail-
ure to file such an account within 10 days after receiving notice of the
owner's demand for clarification will dissolve the lien.Y0 This proce-
dure, however, does not suffice as an adequate substitute for a
prompt hearing on the merits of the claim and the West Virginia
statute probably could not withstand a procedural due process chal-
lenge.
The Virginia mechanics' lien statute 71 appears to reflect an ade-
quate constitutional accommodation of competing interests. In Virg-
nina, liens attach when the first work is done or materials fur-
nished. 72 A claim of lien must be filed with the clerk of court within
90 days and an enforcement suit brought within six months of com-
IS Id. at §§ 8 to 13 (1966).
'" Id. at 9§ 9, 11, 13.
"e Id. at 9§ 8, 10, 12. Persons supplying labor and materials under a direct con-
tract with the property owner must include in their claim the name of the owner, a
description of the property and structures involved, and the amount due. Although this
information is scant, it should be deemed adequate since the two parties have a direct
contract, the provisions of which supply necessary details. See note 168 infra.
'' W. VA. CODE §§ 38-2-9, 11, 13 (1966). Those persons without a direct contrac-
tual relationship with the owner must provide the information required in § 38-2-8,
see note 167 supra, and a description of the nature of the subcontract together with
an itemized account of the nature and quantity of any materials or services supplied
and the dates on which such materials or services were delivered or performed.
... W. VA. CODE § 38-2-19 (1966).
170 Id.
'71 VA. CODE §§ 43-1 to 23.2 (1976).
'7' W. T. Jones & Co. v. Foodco Realty, Inc., 318 F.2d 881 (4th Cir. 1963) (applying
Virginia law); Hadrup v. Sale, 201 Va. 421, 111 S.E.2d 405 (1959).
MECHANICS' LIENS
pleting work. 7 3 Within the 90 day period, those providing labor or
materials without a contract with the owner also must give written
notice to the owner of the claim of lien,'74 and this notice must be
accompanied by a memorandum and sworn affidavit detailing the
facts and bases of the claim.' 5 While there are no provisions for
judicial participation in the perfection of the lien or substitution of a
bond for the property, the Virginia statute does provide for a post-
perfection hearing.'76 After reasonable notice to the lien claimant, the
court will hold a hearing and determine the validity of the lien.'
Added in 1975, this provision for a post-perfection hearing in conjunc-
tion with the additional safeguards, would probably satisfy due pro-
cess requirements in accommodating the several interests involved."'
While the Supreme Court has not definitively examined the con-
stitutional validity of mechanics' liens statutes, recent decisions in-
volving other prejudgment creditors' remedies offer sufficient guide-
lines for such an assessment. Undoubtedly, the Court has moved
decisively away from earlier decisions which appeared to mandate
notice and a hearing prior to any significant property deprivation.
Currently, the focus of procedural due process under the fourteenth
amendment is aimed at an accommodation of the competing inter-
ests of the creditor as well as the debtor. The Court has not, however,
invoked a case-by-case analysis of the affected interests. Still main-
taining the flexibility of due process, the trend appears to be to pre-
7' VA. CODE §§ 43-4, 7, 9 (1976).
" Id. at §§ 7, 9.
M75 Id. at §§ 4, 5, 8, 10. The statute requires lien claimants to attach a memoran-
dum specifying the names and addresses of the property owner, the general contractor,
and the claimant, and detailing the amount of the lien, the time when the amount is
due, a description of the property, the type of materials or services furnished, and the
type of structure for which the work or materials were furnished. While this informa-
tion may not be as detailed as that required under the West Virginia statute, see text
accompanying notes 167-168 supra, it apparently satisfies the Mitchell requirement of
providing the facts supporting the claim. See text accompanying notes 96, 114, & 138-
142 supra.
.7. VA. CODE § 43-17.1 (1976). The statute provides that "[any party, having an
interest in real property against which a lien has been filed may. . . petition the court
of equity having jurisdiction . . . to hold a hearing to determine the validity of any
perfected lien."
,7 Id. The statute provides that after "reasonable notice" to the lien claimants
and other interested parties, the court shall hold a hearing to determine the validity
of the lien. Id. at § 17.1 (1976). Moreover, the statute provides that upon a finding that
the lien is invalid, the court shall order the lien be dissolved. Id.
'1" Davey Tree Expert Co. v. Jeffrey Sneider & Co., Chancery No. 45660 (Cir. Ct.
Fairfax Cty., Nov. 18, 1975), upheld the constitutionality of Virginia mechanics' lien
statute.
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scribe minimal procedures applicable to a particular substantive area
of the law. Applying this approach to the conflicting interests in the
area of mechanics' liens, many long-standing statutes are vulnerable
to due process challenges.
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